



HOSTED BY:



2025 **ISPO CONFERENCE**  
DUBAI | UAE | NOV 27 - 28





**Safe. Reliable. Economical.**

**Promoting Safe Navigation  
Through Collaboration**



# Overview of Seaspan Operations

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## Integrated with Global Trade

#1

Independent containership  
owner and operator

16676

Total no. of Arrival/Departure in 1 year

8338

Total no. of port calls in 1 year

98

Total no. of findings

3

Total no. of incidents

## Best-In-Class Fleet



225 ships<sup>1</sup>

~2.3mn TEU

~5.3 years

Average age

# 99.98%

Safe berthing/unberthing percentage



6,251 employees

(5,905 Seafarers/ 346 Corporate)



# Establishment of the Navigation Cell Evyap-Turkey-Allision with jetty and gantries

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## HIGH-RISK SCENARIOS IN BUSY TERMINALS

Risk of collisions and allisions are rising in busy terminals especially during



### PILOT EMBARKATION / DISEMBARKATION

Failure of pilot ladders or improper rigging practices leading to serious injuries and fatalities

### OVERTAKING OR CLOSE QUARTER SITUATIONS IN NARROW CHANNELS

- Hydrodynamic interaction.
- Bends, shallow depths, limited UKC, strong currents increase risks during overtaking



### FINAL APPROACHES TO BERTHS

- Excessive approach and lateral speed
- Inadequate passage plans, improper MPEx and incorrect assessment of available berth space can all contribute to incidents

## OPERATIONAL AND HUMAN FACTORS CHALLENGES & SUGGESTIONS FOR SAFER PILOTAGE



Pilot's limited familiarity with vessel handling



Bridge team's limited familiarity with local conditions



Ambiguity in role clarity between Master and Pilot



Commercial pressure to reduce maneuvering time



Insufficient bridge team engagement / challenge culture




Language barriers with tugs, pilots, or VTS

# List of common findings


- Vessels crossing abort point without Pilots
- Pilots not boarding at PBG




- High Speed approach (Longitudinal)



- Berthing with angular approach but not parallel



- Tugs not arriving in time




- High Speed approach(Lateral)



## Core Functions of the Navigation Safety Cell

### VESSEL TRACK REVIEW UNDER PILOTAGE



PARALLEL  
BERTHING  
OPERATIONS



NON-COMPLIANCE  
WITH THE COLREGS  
including close-quarters  
situations or near misses



PILOT BOARDED  
AT THE DESIGNATED  
PILOT BOARDING  
STATION



TUGS WERE EMPLOYED/  
MADE FAST  
AT PLANNED POSITIONS



COMPLIANCE WITH  
THE PASSAGE PLAN

### CLOSING THE LOOP

SHARING THE  
FINDINGS WITH  
BRIDGE TEAM




ENGAGE WITH  
PILOTS AND PORT  
WHERE NECESSARY



REVIEW FEEDBACK  
FROM BRIDGE TEAM



SHARE LESSON  
LEARNT WITH  
THE FLEET




## Total arrival and departure with comparison to total findings




## Actions taken to address high risk ports

- ✓ Guidance sent to master and bridge team to avoid reoccurrence
- ✓ Fleet wide alert and reminders
- ✓ Training, work improvement for bridge team where applicable
- ✓ Near miss reporting when applicable
- ✓ Master to issue letter of protest to pilots/terminals where applicable
- ✓ Port and pilots of these ports have been contacted by designated person ashore and alerted of a risk of collision/allision
- ✓ Ongoing communication with these ports to prevent any navigational incidents with Seaspan ships

## No. of Navigational Incidents





## Finding

- Vessel picked up pilot inside the break water from outbound ship.
- Both vessel's momentarily without pilot inside the break water.
- No tugs fast
- Crossed abort point without pilot

## Actions Taken

- Engagement with Ashdod Pilots
- Masters advised to hold ground and not cross the pilot boarding point.

# Findings and corrective actions: Arr. Caucedo-Pilot not boarding at PBG-High speed approach-Soft Grounding




## Finding:

- Pilot not boarding at PBG
- High speed approach
- Tugs not fast in time
- No time for MPEX due to late pilot boarding
- Vessel not able to execute turn led to soft grounding

## Actions Taken:

- Engagement with Caucedo port/Pilots.
- Enquired about delayed pilot boarding.
- Master briefed to comply with company's guidance on approach speed

# Findings and corrective actions: Arr. Singapore-vessel went too close to land/shallows and carried out evasive maneuver



## Actions Taken


- Engagement with MPA Singapore
- Investigation of maneuver in progress by MPA Singapore.

- After Picking up pilot, vessel proceeded north of the track very close to land/shallows and carried out evasive maneuver in Singapore straits TSS, by cutting across the separation zone and joined wrong direction of traffic flow and cutting across the separation zone again to join the correct direction of traffic flow .
- Similar approach was observed for other Seaspan vessels too.
- Non-compliance with COLREGS and Lack of situational awareness.

## Findings and corrective actions:

Arr. Kingston-Incorrect positioning in turning basin-Strong SE'ly winds  
-close quarter with quay

 seaspan




## Actions Taken:

- Engagement with Kingston port/Pilots.
- Enquired about maneuver-Pilots

## Finding:

- ZIM Mount Elbrus while approaching to turning basin with pilot onboard and 3 tugs made fast, she was positioned more on the port side rather than remaining centered in the basin.
- Strong Southeasterly wind of 30-35kts began to push the vessel towards jetty. Vessel came dangerously close to the quay and was very fortunate that no ship was berthed at the pier.

# Findings and corrective actions: Arr. Barcelona-High speed approach



## Finding:


- Very High-speed approach
- Entering Break water at 12kts
- Unable to make fast tugs due to high speed

## Actions Taken:

- Master briefed to comply with company's guidance on approach speed
- Discussed associated risk of grounding/allision due to high speed

## Findings and corrective actions:

Arrival Los Angeles-High speed approach- Approx 400 m from the knuckle of the pier



## Actions Taken:

- A meeting was held in person with Los Angeles pilots to discuss the matter

## Finding:

- Vessel enters the breakwater at 10kts. Tugs approaching.
- Approx 400 m from the knuckle of the pier, speed 9.1 kts, with 3 tugs draft 14.9m. Astern power 20% of the ahead power.
- The vessel's highspeed maneuver within the break water, leaves very little margin of error for contingencies like blackout or steering failure
- Similar approach was observed for other large container vessels
- Loss of Engine Power: A vessel of 100000 Tons displacement, at 6 knots

# Positive changes after the meeting:



## Seaspan Beacon



## Seaspan Emerald



## Seaspan Beyond



**The Port Authority of Jamaica**

**NOTICE TO MARINERS**  
**NO. 7 OF 2025**  
**JAMAICA SOUTH COAST**  
**KINGSTON HARBOUR**

Mariners and other interested parties are hereby advised that the Port Authority has established an Alternate Pilot Boarding Station for the Port of Kingston between the No.5 (Green) buoy and the No. 6 (Red) buoy in the Kingston East Channel in position  $17^{\circ} 54'.85\text{ N}$ ,  $076^{\circ} 46'.95\text{ W}$ .

The Alternate Pilot Boarding Station is to be used to facilitate safe embarkation/disembarkation of Pilots due to heavy seas and high winds.

**SGD: Captain (N) Sydney Innis**  
**HARBOUR MASTER**  
**October 10, 2025**

### Finding:


- Designated Pilot Boarding Ground is 0.5 Nm before Channel entry but pilots boarding always between green buoy no 5 and red buoy no 6.
- No Established alternate pilot boarding station between green buoy no 5 and red buoy no 6.

### Actions Taken:

- Office engaged with port Authority to include the alternate pilot boarding area as official boarding ground.
- Suggested change incorporated and Notice to Mariners No.7 of 2025 issued by Kingston Harbour Master.

## 7.3 Passage Planning

- 7.3.1 Pilot organization ensures proper planning and execution of pilotage as per local ,national and international requirements
- 7.3.2 Pilot organization and pilot exchange information to enable effective pilotage planning before commencing the act of pilotage
- 7.3.3 Detailed information exchange must occur between pilot and Master/bridge team before pilotage begins.
- 7.3.4 Pilots passage plan should be reviewed and updated during passage, with all parties(Master and bridge team) informed.
- 7.3.5 Pilots hand-over to other pilot during long passage must occur on the vessel's bridge with a clear and defined procedure.
- 7.3.6 Roles and communication between pilot and supporting pilot must be clearly defined for the Master's understanding.





# Enhancing Navigation Safety Using ORCA AI and AVIKAS

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- Enables us to monitor vessel movements across global waters
- All safety events are logged with data and visual records.
- Close encounters , unsafe maneuvers , excessive speed are recorded as per high, medium & low risk events
- Provides target data & alerts the user
- Allows replay of incidents for root cause analysis and investigation



# Engagement with Port and Pilot Associations



- MPA Singapore
- Kaohsiung Port -Taiwan
- Tangier Med Pilots/Port -Morocco
- Luanda port Authority-Angola
- Los Angeles Pilots -USA
- Pusan- South Korea
- Jebel Ali- UAE
- Caucedo- Dominican Republic
- Mundra-India
- Rotterdam-Netherlands
- Hong Kong
- Damietta-Egypt
- Ashdod-Israel


## Continuous Improvement

- Analysis of challenging ports
- Analysis of high-risk approaches (Speed, Angle of approach, insufficient Tugs)
- Share lesson learned with fleet
- Identify high risk ports and caution the fleet
- Suggest training needs to address any identified gaps related to human factors
- Navigation webinar



## Positive changes observed in Bridge Team and Port/Pilots

- Reduced number of navigational findings
- Pilots boarding at Pilot boarding grounds
- Ship staff is more empowered.
- Most of the vessels are compliant as per Seaspan's requirement.





!! THANK YOU !!